

Vertical restraints – An economist's perspective

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Starting point

- Restrictions by object vs. the more economic approach
 - Effects-based enforcement of Article 101 TFEU: the "object paradox" (Damien Gerard, 2012)
- Discussion after Leegin 2007 vs. current activities/positions of European antitrust authorities (AAs)
 - BWB RPM Conference September 2008 BKartA RPM Guidelines grocery retail industry (2017)
- Coty decision, and subsequent EC brief
- Economist's take on vertical restraints, in particular RPM
 - Why RPM: Many other practices (platform and internet sale bans) are work arounds to achieve the same goal



Agenda and message

- Ingredients and background of economic thinking about VR
- Efficiencies and anticompetitive effects associated with VR
 - RPM, implemented by manufacturers
 - Platform and internet bans, dual pricing strategies
 - RPM, "enforced" by retailers
 - Price parity clauses
 - Exclusive content vs. exclusionary practices
 - Vertical mergers

Message:

If no (significant) market power (Posner's 'monopoly power'), no competition policy problem. Otherwise: Rule of reason!

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Ingredients of the economic approach

- Firms are profit maximizing and (more or less) rational
 ⇒No one voluntarily accepts smaller share of pie than 'necessary'
 ⇒C.p. supplier rather has low cost retailer distribute its product
- Questions / Problems:
 - \Rightarrow What is (consumer) welfare effect of certain behavior/ practices? \Rightarrow Potential long run effects: dynamic rather than static view
- Problem: 'Imperfect' world
 - Economies of scale
 - Uncertainty, asymmetric information, and externalities
- \Rightarrow 'Perfect' competition is not a proper benchmark



Horizontal and vertical externalities in vertical structures

- Double marginalization [if upstream and downstream market power exists]
- horizontal externalities of service provision (Telser 1960), certification of quality (Marvel und McCafferty 1984), ...

 \Rightarrow Consumer (and 'discounter') free riding

• Vertical externality with complementary investments, sales efforts (reputation), public goods character of retailer

 \Rightarrow Retailer and manufacturer free riding, resp.

- ⇒ Institutions ('Agreements'; VRs) beyond arms-length trading necessary to provide efficient distribution system
- \Rightarrow EU Block exemption regulation



How RPM and other VRs solve externality problem and enhance efficiency - Examples

- Double marginalization [if upstream and downstream market power exists]
 - ⇒Classic problem: Everyone wants to have his margin (Brewers, wholesalers, retailers)
 - \Rightarrow Prices too high from industry perspective, demand too low
 - \Rightarrow Vertical integration, RPM ceiling, two part tariffs solve problem
 - \Rightarrow VRs increase consumer welfare
- \Rightarrow Vertical externality
 - \Rightarrow Negative incentive on innovative activity
 - \Rightarrow Only part of return from innovation accrues to innovator



The horizontal externality problem – Free riding

- 'Service' provision (Telser 1960)
 - Service provision argument 2.0: Showrooming vs. webrooming
 - Asics, Sennheiser, Denon & Marantz
 - BSH home appliances \Rightarrow dual pricing
 - Corner bookstores \Rightarrow 'make' fiction bestsellers
- Certification of 'quality' (Marvel und McCafferty 1984)
 - Amazon marketplace, HRS, Booking.com, [Pierre Fabre]
 - \Rightarrow Price parity clauses (narrow (+) and wide (-))
- Inventory (Krishnan und Winter 2007)
 - Books, Asics, Haribo, BSH, Sennheiser, Denon & Marantz

⇒ Consumer (and 'discounter') free riding



The vertical externality problem – Free riding

- Complementary 'investments'
 - Premium products: Coty
 - Distribution channel/price as signal of quality: Pierre Fabre
- Sales efforts/promotional services (reputation) (Klein and Murphy, 1988)
 - \Rightarrow No consumer free riding
 - Brand name apparel (Levi's)
 - Dornbracht, Pierre Fabre
- public goods character of retailer
 - Book stores (spontaneous purchases)

\Rightarrow Retailer and manufacturer free riding, resp.



Potential anticompetitive effects of VR (in particular of RPM)

- Manufacturer Cartel and softening of inter-brand competition, resp. (Guidelines on VR, 100,b)
- Upstream foreclosure (Guidelines on VR, 100,a)
- Dealer cartel and softening of intra-brand competition, resp.(Guidelines on VR, 100,c)
- Downstream foreclosure (Guidelines on VR, 100,a)
- ⇒ Downstream foreclosure ('forced' RPM and exclusivity, rsp. by dominant retailer) arguably most relevant
- ⇒ Where are the anticompetitive effects in the recent EC and BKartA – RPM cases??



The effect of VRs: Preliminary weighing up

• Conclusion from theory:

Motta (2004): "Vertical restraints and vertical mergers are anticompetitive only if they involve firms endowed with significant market power. ... An efficient policy [...] would grant exemption to <u>all</u> the vertical restraints of firms which do not have large market power. [A] rule of reason should be adopted, and one should balance possible efficiency effects with possible anti-competitive effects [if firms with significant market power involved].

• Empirical results:

Lafontaine/Slade (2008): Despite ambiguous theoretical results, empirical evidence "surprisingly consistent": Restraints imposed by manufacturers typically increase consumer welfare.

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Exclusivity (preliminary thoughts)

- Foreclosure by platforms and retailers
 - Radius restrictions (ED) (Brühn/Götz 2018), Toys "R" Us (RPM)
- But: **Exclusivity** might be important procompetitive device if introduced by upstream firms:
 - Video games industry (Lee 2013) \Rightarrow Facilitates entry,
 - Brewers and pubs (Lafontaine/Slade 2008) ⇒ ensures efficient investment
 - Apple iPhone and mobile network operator ⇒ disrupts (?)
 collective dominance/tacit collusion [Countervailing power]
 - AT&T/Time Warner (DirecTV) \Rightarrow dto (?)

⇒ Reinvigorates competition and gives consumers better deal




(Tentative) Conclusions


- Not covered above:
 - What is significant market power? 30% market share in BER ⇒Market definition critical (SSNIP in two-sided platforms)
 - CTS Eventim [Leniency as Industrial Policy??]
- Lessons:
 - Freedom to compete not equal to license to free ride
 - With externalities efficiency [often] requires restraints
 - Given powerful retailers and platforms VRs (introduced by manufacturers) provide welcome countervailing power

 \Leftrightarrow (Over-) Enforcement has long run effects on market structure and innovation \Rightarrow more powerful retailers and platforms?





The future without RPM: MF & B&M-R view



The future with RPM: the enforcers' view

Manufacturers

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Final thoughts for enforcers

- The end is **not** near in a world with RPM
 - See US after Leegin (Marvel 2017, Contact lenses??)
- Important: Don't beleaguer 'small' companies!
- Fine (= tax) large companies (the big business: GAFA), but don't distract them from there core business
 ⇒No second Microsoft Windows Vista ◆
- Never enforce a 'no single buyer' rule for UEFA Champions League and German Bundesliga
- And don't interfere with exclusive dealings between brewers and pubs





QUESTIONS & REMARKS

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